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Abstract Large-scale cooperation underpins the evolution
of ecosystems and the human society, and the collective be-
haviors by self-organization of multi-agent systems are the
key for understanding. As artificial intelligence (AI) prevails
in almost all branches of science, it would be of great inter-
est to see what new insights of collective behavior could be
obtained from a multi-agent AI system. Here, we introduce a
typical reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm – Q learning
into evolutionary game dynamics, where agents pursue op-
timal action on the basis of the introspectiveness rather than
the birth-death or imitation processes in the traditional evo-
lutionary game (EG). We investigate the cooperation preva-
lence numerically for a general 2× 2 game setting. We find
that the cooperation prevalence in the multi-agent AI is amaz-
ingly of equal level as in the traditional EG in most cases.
However, in the snowdrift games with RL we also reveal
that explosive cooperation appears in the form of periodic
oscillation, and we study the impact of the payoff structure
on its emergence. Finally, we show that the periodic oscil-
lation can also be observed in some other EGs with the RL
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algorithm, such as the rock-paper-scissors game. Our results
offer a reference point to understand emergence of cooper-
ation and oscillatory behaviors in nature and society from
AI’s perspective.
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1 Introduction
In the ecosystem and human society, the phenotypic traits of
different species and their behavior characters are very com-
plex and diverse [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8], which remain a puzzle
till now. In 1973, the pioneering framework of evolutionary
game (EG) theory was proposed to investigate the frequency
of the competing populations in the ecosystem by incorpo-
rating the classic game theory and the concept of evolution
[9]. Inspired by the idea, many research emerge [10,11,12,
13,14,15,16,17,18], with emphasis on the mechanisms be-
hind the emergence of cooperation among unrelated individ-
uals [19,20,21,22], and various mechanisms are revealed,
such as direct or indirect reciprocity [11,20,23], topologi-
cal effect [13,14,24,25,26,27,28,29], self-adaption [14,30,
31], among others [13,24,25,32,33].
In parallel, machine learning flourishes in the past decades
[34,35,36,37,38,39] that facilitates the applications of Ar-
tificial Intelligence (AI) to many other fields, such as pat-
tern recognition [36,40,41], disease prediction [42,43,44,
45], decision making in games as well as human-level con-
trol [45,46,47,48], and so on [49,50,51,52]. Reinforcement
learning (RL) as one of the most powerful machine learning
approaches [37,38,39,48], which is rooted in psychology
and neuroscience, has been widely used to solve the prob-
lems in terms of states, actions, rewards, and decision mak-
ing in various environments through exploratory trials [37,
53,54]. Commonly used RL algorithms include temporal
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differences [37,55], dynamic programming [37,39,56,57],
Dyna [37], Sarsa [37] and Q-learning [37,58,59,60], which
have made tremendous progresses and become the most ex-
citing fields in AI. While the expertise of RL and AI in gen-
eral make them a good candidate for understanding the com-
plex behaviors in ecosystem and society such as coopera-
tion, there is still a lack of such cross-fertilization.
Interesting questions are then raised: what’s the perfor-
mance in term of cooperation level if AI agents play the
game together? And what’s the difference between AI-agent
systems and the traditional evolutionary games following
rules like birth-death or imitation processes mimicking hu-
man systems? Addressing these questions is of paramount
importance because clarifying the similarities and difference
between AI and human system is the primary step to design
human-machine systems, which is the inevitable trend in the
future.
Here we investigate the collective behavior of AI agents
in 2×2 reinforcement learning evolutionary games (RLEGs),
specifically by means of Q-learning algorithm and compare
them to the traditional EG. In each round, an agent in the
population initiates a number of trial games with the rest, all
individuals try to maximize their payoff and meanwhile they
learn from their experiences. A striking finding is that the
cooperation in the RLEGs evolve almost identical level as
in the traditional EGs. However, in the snowdrift RLEGs we
reveal that explosive cooperation appears in the form of pe-
riodic oscillation, which is able to improve the cooperation
preference to some extent. Furthermore, different from EGs,
the emergence of periodic oscillation is ubiquitous if there
is a unique and mixed weak Nash equilibrium in the payoff
matrix of the game setting, such as rock-paper-scissors and
snowdrift game. Finally, we provide a qualitative explana-
tion for these observations in RLEGs and in particular the
impact of the learning parameters on the oscillatory behav-
iors.
2 Results
2.1 Reinforcement learning evolutionary game model
We start by introducing our reinforcement learning evolu-
tionary game (RLEG), where each agent could be in one
of ns states within the state set S = {s1, · · · sns} and
each could take one of na actions from the action set A =
{a1, · · · ana}. In each round τ , a random agent i is chosen
in the system as an initiator, and plays a battery of pair-
wise games with the rest individuals (also called partici-
pants) with na-actions (2 × na). Here, the elements in S
and A are distinguished by their nature (state or action) but
in typical cases they are just the same e.g. being cooperation
(C) or defection (D). At the end of the round, i gets a reward
according to its opponents’ action and its own according to
a payoff matrix
Π =
 Πa1a1 · · · Πanaa1... . . . ...
Πa1ana · · · Πanaana
 ,
where Πaa′ denotes i’s reward if agent i with action a is
against its opponent with action a′. Therefore, i’s average
payoff at round τ is Π¯i(τ) =
∑
j∈Ω\iΠaiaj (τ)/(N − 1),
where Ω \ i refer to all agents excluding initiator i.
In the classical Q-learning algorithm [61], each agent
seeks for optimal strategies in the sense that it maximizes
the expected values of total reward by updating the so-called
Q-table through learning. A key difference between initia-
tors and participants is that initiators update both their states
and Q-table, while each participant only takes one action
as a response, see Fig.1. This setting accounts for the fact
that the initiators are actively engaged in the game that they
seek for higher rewards, and always try to improve their wis-
dom via Q-table during the process, while participants are
only passively involved in the games proposed without the
expectation of lifting wisdom. Note that, the setting is just
equivalent to asynchronous updating of Monte Carlo (MC)
simulations [62,63].
The Q-table is a matrix of state (rows) – action (columns)
combinationS ×A → < as
Q(τ) =
 Qs1a1(τ) · · · Qs1ana (τ)... . . . ...
Qsnaa1(τ) · · · Qsnsana (τ)
 .
With this matrix, if the initiator i’ state and action are s and
a at τ th round, the element Qsa is updated as follows
Qsa(τ + 1) = g (Q(τ), r(τ))
= Qsa(τ)(1− α) + α [r(τ) + γQmaxs′a′ (τ)] , (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1] is the learning rate and r(τ) = Π¯i(τ) is
the reward received for the action moving from s(τ) to s(τ+
1). Qmaxs′a′ = maxa′(Qs′a′) is the maximum element in the
row of next state s′, which is the estimate of optimal future
value at s′. The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor
determining the importance of future rewards. Agents with
γ = 0 are short-sighted that they just consider the current
rewards, while those with larger γ have better foresight. The
evolving Q-function then can be expressed as Q(τ + 1) =
g (Q(τ), r(τ)), and Qsa(τ) is replaced byQsa(τ +1) at the
end of each round.
When the initiator i is in state s at τ th round, it takes
action following Q-table
a(τ) = h (Q (τ) , s(τ)) = arg max
a′
{Qsa′(τ)}, a′ ∈ A
with probability 1 − , or a random action otherwise. No-
tice that, arg max
a′
(Qsa′(τ)) represents the action with the
maximal Q-value in the row of state s. Each participant in
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Fig. 1 (Color online) The schematic diagram of the updating pro-
cess in the well-mixed system. At round τ , a game is proposed by an
initiator i against all the rest agents known as participants like j in the
system. The initiator i takes action according to h function with proba-
bility 1− , or acts randomly otherwise. The initiator i both updates its
Q-table following g function and replaces its state s by current action
at the end of round τ , while a participant j only takes action following
its Q-table in response, but without updating its Q-table and state.
the round always selects the action with the largest value of
Qsa′(τ) as Fig.1 shows. At the end of the round, i’s state
s(τ) is instead of s(τ + 1) = a(τ), i.e. s′ = a in the Eq.(1).
To summarize, the protocol of Q-learning algorithm is
as follows:
1) Initialize matrix Q to zero to mimic the unawareness of
agents to the game or environment at beginning, and ini-
tialize state s of each agent randomly.
2) For each round, a randomly generated initiator i plays
the game with the rest agents and chooses the action a
with largest value of Qsa′(τ) in the row of current state
s with probability 1 − , or chooses an action randomly
with probability .
3) The Qsa value of the initiator is updated according to
Eq. (1), and the state is also updated as s(τ + 1) = a(τ).
4) Each participant only takes the action awith largest value
of Qsa′(τ) in the row of its current state s as response,
therefore s(τ + 1) = s(τ).
5) Repeat steps 2) – 4) until the system state becomes sta-
tistically stable or evolves to the desired time duration.
Notice that agents in RLEGs that adopt reinforcement
learning aim to maximize reward gradually rather than birth-
death or imitation processes in the traditional evolutionary
game and its variants [1,4,64]. Besides, the coupling be-
tween the environment and agents’ behaviors gives rise to a
dynamic environment, which is different from paradigmatic
Q-learning algorithm that individuals confront a static en-
vironment. This work is also different from the previously
studied minority game system [65] that takes into account a
periodic environment. Our setting then offers a scenario for
complex coevolution where the adaption process and envi-
ronment influence each other and trigger the emergence of
some interesting collective behaviors. In the following, we
will show the main results and the impact of various param-
eters on the actions and dynamical behaviors in the popula-
tion.
2.2 Simulation Results in 2× 2 RLEGs
In the RLEGs for a 2 × 2 game setting, the actions set and
states set are the same as A = S = {C,D}, and the stan-
dard payoff matrix Π = (Πcc, Πcd;Πdc, Πdd) = (6, b; 6 +
b, 2) with a tunable game parameter b. Different ranges of
b correspond to different game categories: 1) b ∈ [0, 2] for
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) with a strict pure Nash equilib-
rium; 2) [2, 6] for Snowdrift (SD) with a weak mixed Nash
equilibrium; 3) (−∞, 0) for Stag Hunt (SH) with two strict
pure Nash equilibriums and a weak mixed Nash equilib-
rium; and 4) (6,∞) for mixed stable (MS) with a mixed
weak Nash equilibrium [1]. The Q-table here is denoted as
Q(τ) = (Qcc(τ), Qcd(τ);Qdc(τ), Qdd(τ)) at round τ .
Before going any further, let’s first review the traditional
EGs for this 2 × 2 game, and specifically focus on the sta-
ble cooperation preference f∗c in the mean-field treatment
by replicator dynamics equation (RDE) [1] of EGs. Denot-
ing ∆Π:d = Πdd − Πcd and ∆Π:c = Πcc − Πdc, in case
I), when ∆Π:c ·∆Π:d < 0, fc = 1 is the stable fixed point
if ∆Π:d > 0 (PD), and fc = 0 is stable otherwise. In case
II), when ∆Π:c · ∆Π:d > 0, there is a stable mixed fixed
point fc = ∆Π:d/(∆Π:d + Π:c) if ∆Π:c < 0 (SD or MS),
otherwise, the fixed-point is unstable (SH). For the latter, co-
operation dominates if the initial preference is greater than
the point, otherwise, defection dominates. In case II), co-
operators’ and defectors’ rewards are identical at the mixed
fixed-point.
We first investigate the cooperation prevalence in our
RLEGs, as a function of b. Here we employ the fraction
ρc(t) =
N∑
l=1
δ(a(τ lt )− C)/N (2)
to assess the cooperation preference in the tth Monte Carlo
(MC) step, which includes N rounds of games denotes as
τ1t , τ
2
t , · · · , τNt . When δ = 1 if the initiator’s action is C
at τ lt round, and δ = 0 otherwise. With these, the average
preference over MC step 〈ρc〉, is used to measures the coop-
eration preference.
Fig. 2 shows the cooperation preference both in RLEGs
by simulations and in EGs as a function of b for a couple
of control parameters. A striking result is that, in almost
all cases 〈ρc〉 are close to f∗c , which means the cooperation
level is equally well when played by AI and by traditional
approaches. And this equivalent performance applies to the
whole range of parameters, implying the robustness to spe-
cific type of games and parameters.
However, a close lookup shows that 〈ρc〉 is slightly greater
than f∗c , and the difference 〈ρc〉 − f∗c depends not only on
learning parameters, but also on the game category (i.e. dif-
ferent b). In SH and PD region, the gap is time-dependent
and enlarged with increasing exploration rate , but is nar-
rowed down when the system approaches into the MS cate-
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Fig. 2 (Color online) The cooperation preference 〈ρc〉 in RLEGs
as a function of b under various combination of parameters. The
cooperation level for traditional EG f∗c is also shown for comparison.
The shared parameters in each panel are as follows: a) γ = 0.9,  =
0.02 and N = 10000; b) α = 0.9,  = 0.02 and N = 10000; c)
α = 0.9, γ = 0.9 and N = 10000; d) α = 0.9, γ = 0.9 and
 = 0.02. The data is averaged over nt = 50000 runs.
gory. Similar to the dependence of f∗c on initialization in SH
EGs, 〈ρc〉 in SH RLEGs also rely on agents’ initial Q-table
and cooperation preferences (Fig. S6 in S2.2). Fig. 2(a-c)
show also that the gap is not only sensitive to  but also to α
and γ when b is in the SD region.
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Fig. 3 (Color online) The oscillatory evolution of ρc(t) under dif-
ferent parameter combinations in RLEGs. The cooperation level for
traditional EG f∗c is also shown for reference. The parameters are indi-
cated in each panels
To understand these differences, we investigate the time
series ρc(t) for typical cases and we mainly focus on SD
games since their differences are most significant. Shown
in Fig. 3 explains how the difference between 〈ρc〉 and f∗c
comes from. Unexpectedly, Fig. 3 reveals an oscillatory struc-
ture of ρc(t) when the games are played by AI agents. In a
typical period, the cooperation preference increases rapidly
after a quiescent stage near f∗c and relaxes to f
∗
c afterwards.
This explains why the cooperation level is enhanced at al-
most all cases in RLEGs than in the EGs. Further research
shows that the period T and amplitude A of the oscillation
increase with γ (b), but decrease with α (a), while larger 
increases the amplitude A but reduces the period T (c). The
oscillation is covered by the noise in the extreme case γ = 0
that all agents are short-sighted as (d) shows. At last, we dis-
cover the oscillatory structure fades away as b approaches b′
(Fig. S5 in S2.1). It implies that the b′ is the transition point
between oscillation and non-oscillation for the cooperation
preference. We would like to note that in the traditional 2×2
EGs, the cooperation preference is always in equilibrium,
oscillation is only possible when more than 2 states/actions
are available in the system.
Next, we further study the impact of the feature of payoff
matrix Π on the oscillation dynamics. The above considers
the weak Nash equilibrium cases, where is ∆Π:d/(∆Π:d +
Π:c), is always smaller than 1/2 in the standard game set-
ting. Here we modify the payoff matrix in SD RLEGs and
show that the form of the oscillation is dramatically changed
compared to the scenarios shown in Fig. 3 when∆Π:d/(∆Π:d+
Π:c) > 1/2 , see Fig. 4(a). In addition, the oscillation fades
away as∆Π:d/(∆Π:d+Π:c) tend to 1/2 as shown in Fig. 4(b).
These suggest that∆Π:d/(∆Π:d+Π:c) = 1/2 is the thresh-
old separating oscillation form in the SD RLEGs. In Fig. 4(c-
d), we also provide typical time series ρc(t) for PD and MS
RLEGs. In both case, the cooperation preference ρc decay
with t to the stable level in the end, without any oscillation
expected. These complexities revealed here are absent in the
traditional SD EGs, and are unique in multi-agent AI sys-
tems.
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Fig. 4 (Color online) The time series of ρc in RLEGs for different
payoff structures. In (a) and (b), the payoff matrices in SD RLEGs are
Π = (6, 5; 7, 2) and (6, 3; 7, 2), respectively. (c) shows the time series
in a PD RLEG with b = 1.5 in a standard payoff matrix to reach the
stable value ρ∗c = /2 . (d) shows the time series in an MS RLEG with
the payoff matrix (0, 3; 5, 2). The learning parameters α = γ = 0.9,
 = 0.02 and N = 10000.
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3 The analysis
3.1 The analysis of the evolution in a static environment
To understand these observations, we build a system that
consists of a number of noninteracting individuals, whose
action and state sets A = S = {C,D}. Different from
RLEGs, rewards for actions C and D are constant and de-
noted as rc and rd respectively, i.e. the environment is as-
sumed to be static for all individuals. As in RLEG, each in-
dividual maximizes reward via reinforcement learning: up-
dates both its Q-table and state. The updating of Q-table in
the Q-learning algorithm involves the self-coupling (mem-
ory effect), inter-elements coupling (effect of estimated fu-
ture reward), and environmental coupling (effect of current
reward), through the learning parameters α, γ and the re-
ward of actions.
To update actions, each individual either follows h func-
tion with probability 1− or acts randomly with . Since the
random scheme shares half chance with identical actions of
following h function, the individual’s action updating can
then be summarized as in Fig. 5(a) and (b). Fig. 5(a) shows
update hops between elements in the individual’s Q-table if
the action is in line with the results following the h func-
tion. In contrast, hops in the cases caused by exploration
events is shown in Fig. 5(b). The events in Fig. (a) and (b)
could be called as “ freezing events”(f-events) and “melt-
ing events”(m-events), respectively. Because /2  1 is in
the model, m-events can be regarded as perturbations in the
world of f-events.
If the system follows only f-events, each individual’s Q-
table will be “frozen” in such a static environment finally.
The freezing rate depends on learning rate α and discount-
ing factor γ, where a larger α facilitates the freezing process,
but γ does the opposite (S1.2). When get frozen, the individ-
uals’ behaviors will be in one of three modes as depicted in
Fig. 5(c):
I) frozen cooperation in the form of C-C mode (CCM) when
arg max
a′
{Qsa′} = C for s = C;
II) frozen defection in the form of D-D mode (DDM) when
arg max
a′
{Qsa′} = D for s = D;
III) cyclic frozen mode in the form of cyclic C-D mode (CDM)
when arg max
a′
{Qsa′} = D for s = C, and arg max
a′
{Qsa′} =
C for s = D.
These frozen modes are reminiscent of various attractors in
nonlinear dynamics, just the convergence rate towards these
attractors is determined by the learning parameters α, γ and
rewards of actions (S1.2), rather than the parameters in equa-
tions.
However, when m-events are present, they do not only
perturb individual’s actions but may also “melt” modes as
Fig. 5(c) shows. Here, the mode is stable if it is robust to m-
Fig. 5 (Color online) The evolution scheme of Q-table in a static
environment. (a) and (b) show the hops between elements in Q-table
under f-events and m-events, respectively. The conditions of different
hops are indicated. (c) shows the freezing and melting processes of
behavioral modes under f-events and m-events, respectively. The indi-
vidual’s behavior will be frozen in one of the three modes (CCM, CDM
and DDM) under f-events. But these modes could be potentially melted
and interchangeable by m-events.
events that cannot be melted. According to the analysis, we
find that only DDM is stable in a static environment as rc <
rd (S1.3), and there is a mode flow CCM→ CDM→ DDM
if rc < rd and  → 0, i.e. the optimal action is reachable
through the reinforcement learning in a static environment.
The dependence of melting rate of the two unstable modes
(i.e., CCM and CDM) on , γ, the reward gap ∆r = |rc −
rd|, and α shows that the former three factors accelerate the
melting process, while γ decreases the process (see S1.3).
At last, elements of individuals’ Q-table in various modes
tend to be identical as rc = rd.
Intuitively, Q-table are beliefs aiming for the optimal ac-
tion for individuals in different states and these beliefs are
updated gradually in the evolution. Low learning rate means
a strong memory effect for individuals because the old Q-
table accounts for history takes a large fraction in the up-
dating. As a result, a large α slows down both the freezing
and melting processes. However, short-sighted individuals
pay much attention to the reward in current round rather
than in future, which means these individuals are more sen-
sitive to the reward gap in the exploratory trials. Meanwhile,
the probability of trials is positive to the exploration rate ,
therefore, γ,  and ∆r accelerate the melting process. Fur-
thermore, a great difference between elements in the row of
state s signifies that it takes longer time to change its be-
lief, i.e. the robustness of the beliefs are enslaved to the gaps
between elements in the rows.
3.2 The stability of the 2× 2 RLEGs
In a well-mixed RLEG, the reward for a cooperative or de-
fective initiator at round τ and rc(τ) = pc(τ)∆Πc: + Πcd
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and rd(τ) = −pc(τ)∆Πd: + Πdd as N → ∞, respec-
tively. Here, ∆Πc: = Πcc − Πcd and ∆Πd: = Πdd −
Πdc, and p(τ) = {pc, pd} denotes the shares of cooperators
and defectors in the agents following h function, acting as
the environment for current initiator. The process to explore
the maximal reward is to narrow reward difference between
agents in the evolution. Here, we denote the equilibrium as
p∗ = {p∗c , p∗d}, at which the agent is unable to explore a
better mode than the current one, therefore is where the evo-
lution of p ideally settles down. Analogy to the Nash equi-
librium point in 2 × 2 game, our equilibrium p∗ can also
be classified into two categories: 1) pure and strict, and 2)
mixed and weak. For the former, reward for initiators under
f -events is greater than under m-events and p∗c ∈ {0, 1},
while for the latter, reward for initiators in f -events equal to
in m-events, i.e. r∗c = r
∗
d at p
∗
c = ∆Π:d/(∆Π:d + Π:c) ∈
(0, 1).
However, an equilibrium point p∗ is stable in a RLEG
only if the system is able to resist various fluctuations around
p∗. For the strict case, initiators are unable to be better off
by updating their mode at p∗, such as DDM in PD RLEGs,
therefore p∗ is stable. Notice that each pure equilibrium
point is stable in 2 × 2 RLEGs, e.g. p∗c = 1 and p∗c = 0
in the RLEGs for SH setting (Fig. S7 and S2.2).
For the mixed case, based on the payoff matrix Π , the
standard game settings are further divided into three classes:
i) ∆Πc: < 0 and ∆Πd: < 0 (MS);
ii) ∆Πc: > 0 and ∆Πd: > 0 (SH);
iii) ∆Πc: > 0 and ∆Πd: < 0 (SD).
The results in the static environment show that the gap be-
tween elements in each row decreases with time if reward
for initiators as cooperator and defector is identical. Thus,
agents’ beliefs become fragile gradually to fluctuations re-
garding p∗, in which r∗c = r
∗
d. The stability of p
∗ rest with
feedback from the change of initiators’ belief to various fluc-
tuations, δpc(τ) = pc(τ)− p∗c → 0.
For class i), since rc (rd) decreases (increases) with pc, a
fluctuation with δpc(τ) < 0 cause rc(τ) > r∗c (rd(τ) < r
∗
d).
The reward change strengthen the beliefs to cooperation but
weaken to defection in any events. With the change of the
latter belief, pc is increased due to the flux from defectors
to cooperators. For a fluctuations with δpc(τ) > 0, the en-
vironment favors defectors rather than cooperators because
rc(τ) < r
∗
c (rd(τ) > r
∗
d) in the fluctuation. Hence, pc would
decrease in this case. In short, the equilibrium point p∗ is
stable in the MS RLEGs because δpc ·dpc/dt < 0 (Fig.4(c)).
By contrast, in case ii) p∗ is unstable (see Fig. S6 and S2.2)
because the feedback of agent to fluctuations regarding p∗
in the RLEG is just opposite to class i).
In case iii), a standard SD RLEG, both rc and rd increase
with pc but the rate of change for rd is higher than for rc.
Thus, as δpc(τ) < 0, the beliefs to defection are more frag-
ile than to cooperation in f-events since rd(τ) < rc(τ) <
r∗c = r
∗
d under the fluctuation. Besides, the shares at equi-
librium point meet p∗c < p
∗
d. For these, the flux from defec-
tors to cooperators is higher than the opposite, which results
in the increase of pc. Therefore, the system is able to re-
sist the fluctuations and keep the system around p∗c (Fig. 3).
For δpc(τ) > 0, the rewards for cooperation and defection
are rd(τ) > r∗c and rc(τ) > r
∗
d but rc(τ) < rd(τ). So,
the beliefs to defection are more fragile than to defection in
m-events. Yet, the flux from defectors to cooperators is still
higher than the opposite potentially because p∗c < p
∗
d. The
flux will give rise to further increase of pc. Hence, the sys-
tem is unstable for this type of fluctuation. Furthermore, the
increase of δpc will cause further destruction of agents’ be-
liefs in m-events. Therefore, an explosive increase of pc is
triggered by the cascading effects as Fig.3 (a-c) shows. The
qualitative investigation also indicate the oscillation fades
away with the gap p∗d − p∗c (Fig.2, 4 (b) and Fig. S6). More-
over, irrhythmic oscillations in non-standard SD RLEGs re-
place periodic oscillation in standard SD RLEGs if p∗c > p
∗
d
(Fig. 4 (a) and Fig. S6).
In fact, during the quiescent stage in standard SD RLEGs,
pc = p
∗
c , agents’ beliefs are weakened gradually. However,
the fluctuations δpc > 0 cause the reward for both actions
in the current round is higher than in the past. Therefore,
some agents beliefs will be replaced by the new one in m-
events, which triggers the increase of cooperators. Thereby,
 improve rate of increase for ρc during the explosive stage
(Fig. 3(c)). In addition, the new belief is strengthened grad-
ually by f-events due to memory effect at quiescent stage
although rc < rd at current stage. Yet, the belief for some
cooperators will be melted finally because rc is always lower
than rd before pc returns to p∗c . Short memory effect and
short-sighted means the reward gap takes a greater effect on
the freezing as well as melting process as mentioned before.
Therefore, high α and low γ decrease the period T as well
as the amplitude A (Fig. 3(a-b)). A higher exploration rate
is able to cause a sharply explosive increase of pc but also
shorten the melting process. Thus,  takes a more complex
effects to T and A in the oscillation as Fig. 3(c) shows.
3.3 The mean-field analysis of PD RLEGs
Here we attempt to construct a mathematical framework on
the PD RLEG for the mean-field treatment, since there is
a single pure strict equilibrium point for the PD game set-
ting. In the standard PD game setting, an arbitrary initia-
tor’s reward is rd(τ) = Π¯d(τ) = (4 + b)pc(τ) + 2 and
rc(τ) = Π¯c(τ) = (6− b)pc(τ) + b as a defector and coop-
erator, respectively. Here, rd is alway higher than rc due to
pc(τ) ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the cooperation preference of ini-
tiators decreases in exploration trials. And, the preference
is the same for initiators and participants just switch their
roles in different rounds. This leads to self-consistent results
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in the end that pc(∞) = p∗c = 0 and 〈ρc〉 = /2 because
〈ρc〉 = p∗c(1− ) + /2. It means that 〈ρc〉 only depends on
the exploration rate  in the PD RLEGs (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 6 (Color online) The time evolution of Q¯(t) and Q-table Q˜∗
at the stable point p∗c . (a-d) show the Q¯cc(t), Q¯cd(t), Q¯dc(t) and
Q¯dd(t), respectively. The time points at which the elements become
stable are indicated. The elements in Q˜∗ are displayed (black lines) for
reference. The parameter setting is the same as Fig. 4(a).
Thus, the stable Q-table for all agents are uniform and is
Q˜∗ =
(
γ(2−b)+b
1−γ
b
1−γ
γ(2−b)+b
1−γ
b
1−γ
)
, (3)
since the rc = b and rd = 2 at p∗c = 0. To check the analysis,
we show the time series of the average Q-table Q¯(t)
Q¯(t) =
( ∑N
k=1 Q
k
cc(τ
N
t )
N
∑N
k=1 Q
k
cd(τ
N
t )
N∑N
k=1 Q
k
dc(τ
N
t )
N
∑N
k=1 Q
k
dd(τ
N
t )
N
)
in the Fig. 6. Here, τNt is the last round in tth MC step and
Qksa(τ
N
t ) denotes the corresponding element of agent k’s
Q-table at τNt th round. Q¯(t) and Q˜
∗ in Fig. 6 show that the
result of stable Q-table is reliable in our analysis. Moreover,
another result in the static environment is also reflected in
PD RLEGs, that is the convergence rate for the elements in
Q-table decreases as Q¯dd, Q¯cd, Q¯dc, and Q¯cc. Q˜ manifests
one element dominant another one for the rival elements be-
cause Q˜∗dd > Q˜
∗
dc and Q˜
∗
cd > Q˜
∗
cc.
A mean-field method is employed to calculate Q(t) and
ρc(t) numerically as Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 6 shows. In Eq. (4) of
mean-field method, we replace each agents’ Q-table with the
mean Q-table. Besides, ρc(τ) means the fraction of agents
at C state in the system, which is slightly different from
cases in the simulation. The final cooperation preference, Q¯
and the ranking of convergence rates in the calculation are
identical to the simulation results. However, the times series
are different during the transient process. The results imply
that, on one hand, the mean-field method successfully cap-
tures long-term dynamics in the PD RLEGs since all agents’
Q-table are identical in the end; on the other hand, the het-
erogeneity of Q-table for different agents cannot be omitted
during transient process and will cause deviations as shown.
The numerical results of MS and SD RLEGs also indicate
that the mean-field results is decent only if heterogeneity of
agents’ Q-table is negligible during whole process ( Fig. S8
and Fig. S9 in S2.2).
3.4 Oscillation in the RLEGs for Rock-Paper-Scissors
game
Different from low-degree of freedom of fluctuation for the
2 × 2 games setting, we pay attention to the game setting
with high-degree of freedom of fluctuation at the equilib-
rium point, p∗. Here, the RLEGs for rock-paper-scissors
(RPS) game is investigated by simulations. In the correspond-
ing RLEGs, the action and state sets areA =S ={R,P, S},
and the payoff matrix is
Π =
Πrr Πrp ΠrsΠpr Πpp Πps
Πsr Πsp Πss
 =
 0 −b1 11 0 −b1
−b1 1 0
 (5)
with a tunable parameter b1. In the traditional EGs, the evo-
lution of collective behaviors is described by f = {fai , ai ∈
A } in a three-dimensional simplex. Here, fai is the ac-
tion preference of ai. The mean field treatment [1] by the
RDE of traditional EGs reveals that: 1) the fixed point f∗ =
{1/3, 1/3, 1/3} is globally stable in the case of b1 < 1; 2)
the fixed point is unstable if b1 > 1; 3) there is a center sur-
rounded by neutral oscillation for b1 = 1. Here, we point
out that in the case 2) the trajectories of the replicator dy-
namics starting from arbitrary interior initial conditions will
converge to the boundary of the simplex in oscillations with
the increasing amplitude.
Figure 7 shows the time series of the fraction of the three
species in the initiators
ρai(t) =
∑N
i=1 δ(a(τ
k
t )− ai)
N
,∀ai ∈ A . (6)
And the shown with red dots are 1/3 ± ∆ρ, where ∆ρ
is the deviation that is computed as the Euclidean distance
between ρ(t) and ρ∗, in which ρ = {ρai |ai ∈ A } and
ρ∗ = {1/3, 1/3, 1/3}. Fig. 7(a) shows the case for b1 < 1
where ρ∗ is globally stable at large except for some small
irregular bursts. However, in the case of b1 ≥ 1 as shown in
Fig. 7(b, c), clear oscillatory structures emerge in the time
series in the RPS RLEGs. The difference for (b) and (c) lies
in the envelope of these oscillatory trajectories, where in the
case of b1 = 1 there is some moments that the amplitude of
oscillation almost diminishes while the oscillation is always
significant in the case of b1 > 1.
In the RLEGs for the RPS game, the equilibrium point
for shares p∗ = {1/3, 1/3, 1/3}, which is mixed and weak.
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
rc(τ) = [ρc(τ) ·Θ(∆Q¯c:(τ)) + ρd(τ) ·Θ(−∆Q¯d:(τ))] ·Πcc+
[ρc(τ) ·Θ(−∆Q¯c:(τ)) + ρd(τ) ·Θ(∆Q¯d:(τ))] ·Πcd
rd(τ) = [ρc(τ) ·Θ(∆Q¯c:(τ)) + ρd(τ) ·Θ(−∆Q¯d:(τ))] ·Πdc+
[ρc(τ) ·Θ(−∆Q¯c:(τ)) + ρd(τ) ·Θ(∆Q¯d:(τ))] ·Πdd
ρc(τ + 1) =
{
ρc(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(∆Q¯c:(τ))
]
+ ρd(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(∆Q¯d:(τ))
]} · ρc(τ)
+ρc(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(−∆Q¯c:(τ))
] N·ρc(τ)−1
N
+ρd(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(−∆Q¯d:(τ))
] N·ρc(τ)+1
N
Q¯cc(τ + 1) = ρc(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(∆Q¯c:(τ))
] · [ (N−1)·Q¯cc(τ)+(1−α)·Q¯cc(τ)+α·(γ·Q¯maxca′ (τ)+rc(τ))
N
]
+
{
1− ρc(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(∆Q¯c:(τ))
]} · Q¯cc(τ)
Q¯dd(τ + 1) = ρd(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(∆Q¯d:(τ))
] · [ (N−1)·Q¯dd(τ)+(1−α)·Q¯dd(τ)+α·(γ·Qmaxda′ (τ)+rd(τ))
N
]
+
{
1− ρd(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(∆Q¯d:(τ))
]} · Q¯dd(τ)
Q¯cd(τ + 1) = ρc(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(−∆Q¯c:(τ))
] · [ (N−1)·Q¯cd(τ)+(1−α)·Q¯cd(τ)+α·(γ·Q¯maxda′ (τ)+rd(τ))
N
]
+
{
1− ρc(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(−∆Q¯c:(τ))
]} · Q¯cd(τ)
Q¯dc(τ + 1) = ρd(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(−∆Q¯d:(τ))
] · [ (N−1)·Q¯dc(τ)+(1−α)·Q¯dc(τ)+α·(γ·Q¯maxca′ (τ)+rc(τ))
N
]
+
{
1− ρc(τ) ·
[

2
+ (1− ) ·Θ(−∆Q¯d:(τ))
]} · Q¯dc(τ)
(4)
Here, Θ(· · · ) is the Heaviside function
Θ(x) =
 1, x > 0,1/2, x = 0,
0, x < 0
and∆Q¯c:(τ) = Q¯cc(τ)−Q¯cd(τ),∆Q¯d: = Q¯dd(τ)−Q¯dc(τ).
The previous analysis shows that the initiators exploring the
optimal mode leads p toward to p∗ and reduce the reward
gap between actions gradually. During the exploring pro-
cess, the amplitude of the oscillation is diminished. How-
ever, the agent’s belief becomes fragile to fluctuations since
the gaps between elements in state row of Q-table are re-
duced. p∗ is stable if the system is able to resist various
fluctuations. The simulation shows that the decrease of b1
makes the system less sensitive to the fluctuations (a-c) as in
EGs. Compare to the EGs, the stability of p∗ depends more
on properties of payoff matrix in RLEGs, they cause abun-
dant collective behaviors in the RLEGs for the identical RPS
game setting. Furthermore, the trajectories here are different
from the cases in the SD RLEGs because the system needs
to resist more comlex and diverse fluctuations to keep p stay
around p∗.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this work, we propose a reinforcement learning evolu-
tionary game model for a general two-player multi-actions
(2× na) game setting, where agents improve their adaption
through Q-learning algorithm rather than birth-death pro-
cess or imitation in the traditional evolutionary games. A
striking finding is that the resulting cooperation preference
in RLEGs is the same as the traditional EGs in 2× 2 cases,
resting on the Nash Equilibrium of the games. Furthermore
we show that Snowdrift game cases present an oscillatory
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r
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Fig. 7 (Color online) The time series of the three fractions in the
RPS RLEGs. The parameter in (a-c) b1 = 0.7, 1 and 2, respectively.
The red dots in the figure is 1/3±∆ρ(t). The learning parameters are
α = γ = 0.9 and  = 0.02, with the system size being N = 10000.
evolution with explosive cooperation in between, exhibiting
quite different dynamical mechanism from the traditional
EGs.
We investigate dynamics of an analogous individual’s Q-
table as well as its behavior in a static environment in theory,
and apply these to analyze the stability of the RLEGs for the
standard 2 × 2 game setting. The analysis indicates that the
pure and strict equilibrium point is stable in the RLEGs for
the game. Different from the stable mixed and weak equi-
librium point for the MS region, oscillatory dynamics po-
tentially emerges for the SD region. The qualitative analysis
explicitly shows the impact of learning parameters on the os-
cillatory dynamics in the SD RLEGs: 1) Low learning rate
and long-term sight is beneficial to amplitude and period by
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the increasing cascading effects after the breakdown of sta-
bility; 2) The long-sighted agents prolong the delay time to
explore optimal action, the quiescent stage, and amplify the
amplitude; 3) Higher exploration rate signifies a sharper in-
crease of cooperation preference after the quiescent stage.
Therefore, low learning rate and high discount factor as well
as exploration rate facilitate the emergence of oscillation in
the RLEGs.
Based on these analysis, one learns that a variety of col-
lective behavior results from the dependence of stability at
the equilibrium point for shares in RLEGs on more prop-
erties of the payoff matrix than in EGs. Furthermore, a nu-
merical method combining with mean-field is put forward
to obtain the dynamics of cooperation preference and aver-
age Q-table in the PD game. The result is partly consistent
with the simulation, especially the final preference and aver-
age Q-table, and analysis in the static environment. We also
show that the oscillatory dynamics is general in the RLEGs
when with a mixed and weak equilibrium point for shares,
such as Rock-Paper-Scissors game, where the collective be-
havior is also quite different from the corresponding tradi-
tional EGs.
Our work could lay out a foundation for further system-
atic investigation of evolutionary games from the perspec-
tive of machine learning. First, the simulations and analy-
sis in the static environment contribute to the further under-
standing analytically in the future. Moreover, the numeri-
cal method embedding the mean-field takes the first step to
build a mathematical framework of the RLEGs. At last, our
work may also aid to understand the explosive events and os-
cillating behaviors in the society since reinforcement learn-
ing actually mimics the introspectiveness in human behavior
patterns.
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1 The reinforce learning in the static environment.
1.1 The preliminary of Q-learning for 2-actions and 2-states setting
To understand 2 × 2 RLEGs, we investigate individuals’ learning dynamics and behavior
features in a static environment. The system consists of a number of non-interacting indi-
viduals owning actions setA = {C,D} and state setS = {C,D}. However, different from
RLEG, rc and rd for actions C and D are constant and the environment is static for each in-
dividual. The learning algorithm for individuals is same as for initiators in RLEG. Here, we
investigate dynamics of an arbitrary individual’s behavior and Q-table since non-interacting
individuals are identical in the system. Similar to initiators’ update method in RLEG, i’s
state s(τ) is replaced previous action a(τ − 1) in the protocol. Then, update hops between
the elements in Q-table are described by a double-layers graph as Fig. 1 (a-b) shows. Each
hop in Fig. 1 is described via an iteration equation, e.g. the update as s(τ) = C, a(τ) = D
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and max{Qda′(τ)} = Qdd(τ) is
Qcc(τ + 1)
Qcd(τ + 1)
Qdc(τ + 1)
Qdd(τ + 1)
 =

1 0 0 0
0 1− α 0 αγ
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


Qcc(τ)
Qcd(τ)
Qdc(τ)
Qdd(τ)
+ α

0
rd
0
0
 .
The equation shows the update of elements in Q-table involve the self-coupling (memory
effects), inter-elements coupling (effect of future reward), as well as coupling with environ-
ment (effect of reward) through learning rate α, discount rate γ and rewards, respectively.
For instance, high γ will enhance the effect of future reward but weaken the sensitive to
reward for a given α.
The learning algorithm in the main text shows individuals have two methods to update
action, 1) according to h function or 2) randomly. However, the random action maybe same
or opposite to the action as follow h-function with an identical probability /2. So, we divide
update events into two kinds on the basis of individual’s action as Fig. 1 (a) and (b) show.
Fig. (a) shows the update events that the individual’s action is in line with h function. Fig. (b)
shows opposite cases resulting from exploration events. The update events in Fig. (a) and
(b) are called as freezing events (f-events) and melting events (m-events), respectively. The
frequency of f-events 1 − /2 is much higher than /2 in the model. Therefore, m-events
can be regarded as a disturbances in the world of f-events. In addition, we just show the
elements associating with events along an update path since no more than two elements in
Q-table associate with an update event only.
If only f-events, each individual’s Q-table will be “frozen” in such a static environment
finally. When frozen, individuals’ behavior will be in one of three modes, i.e. update events
form a closed path in the layer of f-events (Fig. 1(c) shows)
I) frozen cooperation in the form of C-C mode (CCM) when argmax
a′
{Qsa′} = C for
s = C;
II) frozen defection in the form of D-D mode (DDM) when argmax
a′
{Qsa′} = D for s = D;
III) cyclic frozen mode in the form of C-D mode (CDM) when argmax
a′
{Qsa′} = D for
s = C, and argmax
a′
{Qsa′} = C for s = D.
However, when m-events are present, they not only perturb individual’s actions but may also
“melt” modes as Fig. 1(c) shows. Here, we appoint an individual is in a certain mode if the
individual is unable to leave it in f-events, and the individual is at the frozen point of the
mode when Q-table is constant in f-events.
1.2 The freezing process and behavior modes
As the individual is in the CCM or DDM at τ moment, the update of Q-table in f-events only
are that
Qcc(τ
′ + 1) = (1− α)Qcc(τ ′) + α
[
γQcc(τ
′) + rc
]
, (1)
and
Qdd(τ
′ + 1) = (1− α)Qdd(τ ′) + α
[
γQdd(τ
′) + rd
]
, (2)
respectively. Here, τ ′ = τ + n(n ∈ N) denotes time in the CCM or DDM. The key element
at the frozen point in CCM and DDM are max{Qca′} = QCCMcc = rc1−γ and max{Qda′} =
QDDMdd =
rd
1−γ , respectively. The freezing rate are
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Fig. 1 (Color online) The update hop of elements on Q-table in different events as well as the freezing
and melting process for behavior modes. (a) and (b) show the hops between elements in Q-table in f-events
and m-events, respectively. The demands of different hop in (a) and (b) is manifested on the corresponding
arrow. (c) shows the freezing and melting process for behavior modes in f-events and m-events, respectively.
Agents’ behavior will be frozen at I) CCM, II) CDM or III) DDM in f-events. These modes are potentially
melted and transformed to each other in m-events.
λfCCM =
|Qcc(τ ′ + 1)−QCCMcc |
|Qcc(τ ′)−QCCMcc | = 1− α+ αγ
and
λfDDM =
|Qdd(τ ′ + 1)−QCCMdd |
|Qcc(τ ′)−QDDMdd |
= 1− α+ αγ,
which suggest high α (short memory) and low γ (short-sighted) accelerates the freezing
process.
After the individual is in the CDM at τ , updates involve two elements in Q-table under
f-events only, Qcd and Qdc. Without loss of generality, we assume Qcd(τ) > Qcc(τ) when
the individual enter the CDM. Then, updates of Q-table in f-events only are{
Qcd(τ
′ + 1) = (1− α)Qcd(τ ′) + α
[
γQdc(τ
′) + rd
]
Qdc(τ
′ + 2) = (1− α)Qdc(τ ′ + 1) + α
[
γQcd(τ
′ + 1) + rc
]
where τ ′ = τ + 2n(n ∈ N) in the CDM. Since Qdc(τ ′) = Qdc(τ ′ + 1) and Qcd(τ ′ + 1) =
Qcd(τ
′ + 2), above updates is translated into matrix expression(
Qcd(τ
′ + 2)
Qdc(τ
′ + 2)
)
=
(
1− α αγ
αγ − α2γ 1− α+ α2γ2
)
·
(
Qcd(τ
′)
Qdc(τ
′)
)
+
(
αrd
α2γrd + αrc
)
(3)
At the frozen points, the key elements in CDM are QCDMcd =
rd+γrc
1−γ2 and Q
CDM
dc =
rc+γrd
1−γ2 .
The freezing rate in two f-events is
λfCDM =
|Qcd(τ ′ + 2)−QCDMcd |
2(|Qcd(τ ′)−QCDMcd |)
=
|Qdc(τ ′ + 2)−QCDMdc |
2(|Qdc(τ ′)−QCDMdc |)
= 2− 2α+ α2γ2 + αγ
√
4− 4α+ α2γ2
which is also positive and negative connected with α and γ as in CCM and DDM. The
analysis shows the key elements at frozen points of three modes are different as rc 6= rd.
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1.3 The melting process and stable mode
A mode is the stable mode if the mode is unable to be eroded in m-events. We insist that there
is only one stable mode as rc 6= rd. Then, we investigate the melting process in different
modes and assume rc < rd without loss of generality. The key elements at frozen points in
three modes meet QCCMcc < QCDMdc < Q
CDM
cd < Q
DDM
dd . The learning algorithm shows elements in
a given state row are rivals because the largest one determine individual’s action at the state.
In fact, a frozen mode will lose the stability if one key element is less than its rival element
in any case. Therefore, we focus the influence of m-event in various closed path on its rival
element.
In the first case, the individual is at the frozen point of CCM, i.e. the key element, Qcc =
QCCMcc , is constant before the mode is melted. Then, the individual takes action D in an m-
event at τ ′. The individual is assumed return to CCM in the next two f-events, i.e. the update
events form a closed path (Fig. 2(a)). Then, our attention is payed on the effect of m-event
on the rival Qcd. To distinct f-events, superscript # is used to denote update in m-events.
Then, the updates following the path are Q#cd(τ ′ + 3)Qdc(τ ′ + 3)
QCCMcc (τ
′ + 3)
 =
 1− α αγ 00 1− α αγ
0 0 1− α+ αγ
 ·
 Qcd(τ ′)Qdc(τ ′)
QCCMcc (τ
′)
+ α
 rdrc
rc
 (4)
Above expression indicates Qdc → γQCCMcc + rc = QCCMcc and Qcd → γQdc + rd > QCCMcc
with the updates along the path. The result manifests Qcd will be greater than QCCMcc finally,
i.e. CCM is to lose the stability under the erosion of m-event in the close path.
In the second case, the individual is at frozen point of CDM and rival elements for key
elements areQcc andQdd. Therefore, the mode is possible eroded if 1) updates ofQcc cause
Qcc > Q
CDM
cd , or 2) updates of Qdd cause Qdd > Q
CDM
dc in m-events. For the case 1), we
assume the individual takes action C in state C at τ ′ in an m-event. Here, the individual’
behavior is also assumed returns to the CDM along a closed path (Fig. 2(c)). Updates in the
path can be expresses as Q#cc(τ ′ + 3)QCDMcd (τ ′ + 3)
QCDMdc (τ
′ + 3)
 =
 1− α αγ 00 1− α αγ
0 αγ − α2γ 1− α+ α2γ2
 ·
 Qcc(τ ′)QCDMcd (τ ′)
QCDMdc (τ
′)
+
 αrcαrd
α2γrd + αrc
(5)
Above updates along the path shows the rival element Qcc tend to QCDMcd + rc < Q
CDM
cd . It
means m-event in the path is unable to melt the mode. For the case 2), the individual’s state
and action are assumed at D at τ ′ in an m-event. Then, updates of Q-table along the closed
path as Fig. 2(d) is that Q#dd(τ ′ + 3)QCDMdc (τ ′ + 3)
QCDMcd (τ
′ + 3)
 =
 1− α αγ 00 1− α αγ
0 αγ − α2γ 1− α+ α2γ2
 ·
 Qdd(τ ′)QCDMdc (τ ′)
QCDMcd (τ
′)
+
 αrdαrc
α2γrc + αrd
(6)
Repeat the path, the rival element Qdd → γQCDMdc + rd > Qdc. Thus, Qdd will greater than
QCDMdc finally. It imply the CDM is unstable in front of erosion of m-event in the path finally.
Above analysis show that key elements at frozen point in different modes meet QCCMcc <
QCDMcd < Q
CDM
dc < Q
DDM
dd . Besides, the CCM and CDM is unstable under erosion of m-events.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the DDM is stable. Here, we denote the indi-
vidual’s final Q-table in the stable mode as Q˜, whose elements Q˜dd is identical to QDDMdd
logically.
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Fig. 2 (Color online) The melting process for different modes in a closed path of events. (a-b) show the
melting process for CCM and DDM in the different path (Eq.(4) and Eq.(7)). (c) shows the melting process
for CDM in two different closed path (Eq.(5) and Eq.(6)). Demands for the hops in the path are showed on
the arrows. Here, an gray arrow denotes the hop in f-event is replaced by one in m-event (yellow arrows). The
black arrows are hops in f-events.
When the individual is at frozen point of DDM, the updates of Qcd and Qdc in a closed
path with an m-event (Fig. 2 (b)) areQ#dc(τ ′ + 3)Qcd(τ ′ + 3)
Q˜dd(τ
′ + 3)
 =
 1− α αγ 00 1− α αγ
0 0 1− α+ αγ
 ·
Qdc(τ ′)Qcd(τ ′)
Q˜dd(τ
′)
+ α
 rcrd
rd
 (7)
Then, Qcd and Qdc will converge to Q˜dd and γQcd + rc following Q˜dd and Qcd, respec-
tively. The rate of convergence is
ΛQcd = limτ→∞
|Qcd(τ ′ + 3)− Q˜cd|
|Qcd(τ ′)− Q˜cd|
= 1− α
ΛQdc = limτ→∞
|Qdc(τ ′ + 3)− Q˜dc|
|Qdc(τ ′)− Q˜dc|
= 1− α (8)
for the m-event in the corresponding path. The probability of forming the closed path are

2 (1 − 2 ). However, the convergence rate in time not only depends on rate of convergence
for m-events but also the probability.
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Fig. 3 (Color online) The melting process for DDM in a closed path with consecutive m-events. The
figure shows melting process for DDM in Eq. (4). The expression on arrows is the condition for the hop.
In the figure, an gray arrow denote hops in f-event is replaced by in m-events (yellow arrow). Black arrows
denote hops in f-events.
The update of Qcc in DDM demands two consecutive m-events to form a closed path
(Fig. 3), which has a much lower probability 
2
2 (1− /2)2. Updates along the path are
Q#dc(τ + 4)
Q#cc(τ + 4)
Qcd(τ + 4)
Q˜dd(τ + 4)
 =

1− α 0 αγ 0
0 1− α αγ 0
0 0 1− α αγ
0 0 0 1− α+ αγ
 ·

Qdc(τ)
Qcc(τ)
Qcd(τ)
Q˜dd(τ)
+ α

rc
rc
rd
rd
 (9)
Repeat the path, the element Qcc converge to γQdc + rd. The rate of convergence for the
m-event in the closed path is
λmcc =
|Qcc(τ ′ + 4)− Q˜cd|
|Qcd(τ ′)− Q˜cd|
= 1− α. (10)
But, the rate of convergence in time is much lower than Qcd and Qdd since it is difficult to
form the path. Here, we point out that Qcd and Qdc also converge to Q˜dd and γQcd + rc
along the path.
In sum,Qcc,Qcd andQdc are converge to γQdc+rd,Qdd and γQcd+rc respectively at
last. But, the converge rate of the Qcc much lower than Qcd and Qdc in time as mentioned.
According to analysis, we get the final Q-table in the stable mode
Q˜ =
(
γ(rd−rc)+rc
1−γ
rd
1−γ
γ(rd−rc)+rc
1−γ
rd
1−γ
)
(11)
The final elements in the mode meet Q˜cd > QCDMcd , Q˜dc > Q
CDM
dc and Q˜cc > Q
CCM
cc . Moreover,
the result suggest the mode is stable indirectly because the rival element Qdc is always less
than Q˜dd.
Above analysis manifest that there are three feasible modes for the individual at the
frozen point in the system. However, only one mode is stable confronting the erosion of m-
events as rc 6= rd. Individuals urging by the reward maximization will adjust their Q-table
and mode. In the adjustment of Q-table, high α increase the converge rate for each corre-
sponding cyclic sequence of events. In time, the converge rate also rely on the probability
of the events. Moreover, the stability CCM < CDM < DDM if rc < rd, which cause indi-
vidual’s behavior form a mode flow CCM→ CDM→ DDM as → 0. At last, we discover
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Fig. 4 (Color online) The graph of update hops of Q-table for the RLGs with 3-actions and 3-states in f-
events. Hops and elements in different modes are marked with different colors except the dark blue. Elements
associated with two modes are marked with a box with a different color frame, e.g. Qsp is associated with
SPRM and SPM. There are eight feasible modes for individuals.
that gap between the rival elements in the stable Q˜ will be reduced with the gap |rc − rd|,
i.e. individuals’ mode become fragile with the decrease of rewards gap.
1.4 The updating graph for 3-actions and 3-states
The modes for 3-actions and 3-states setting is much more complex than for 2-actions and
2-states setting. For a 3-actions and 3-states setting, the actions set and states set are A =
S = {R,P, S}. There are eight feasible modes for individuals in the updating graph shown
in Fig. 4. Here, we figure out the modes containing identical actions is probably different,
e.g. the mode in the form of cyclic R-S-P (RSPM) is different from in the form of cyclic R-
P-S (RPSM). On the basis of the graph, one learns there are more melting channels to erode
each frozen mode compare with 2-actions and 2-states setting. Because of the complexity of
graph and melting channels, we abandon the subtle analysis on the multi actions setting in a
static environment as in the previous and merely provide the updating graph.
2 Supplementary results in 2× 2 RLEGs
In the section, we provide supplements in 2×2 for the main text and investigate SH RLEGs
further in simulation. The supplementary for the M2.2 are manifested in 2.1 and 2.2 mainly.
Furthermore, we investigate the SH RLEGs further by simulation in 2.2. The supplements
about SD and MS numerical results for M3.3 is provided in 2.3.
2.1 The further simulation and investigation in SD RLEGs
Fig. M2 shows there is transition point b′ for 〈ρ〉 as the function of b in the standard SD
RLEGs. The cooperation preference is changed abruptly around the point. Thereupon, we
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Fig. 5 (Color online) The time series of ρc overMC step in standard SDRLEGs. The learning parameters
in panels α = γ = 0.9,  = 0.02. The number of agentsN = 10000. For learning parameters combination,
the transition point between oscillation and non-oscillation is b′ = 3.24 as Fig. M2 shows.
conjecture b′ is the transition point of the collective behavior in the SD RLEGs. As b < b′,
a periodic oscillation emerge in the system. For b > b′ the oscillation is replaced by a
non-oscillation form. Here, we provide a batch of simulation to verify the conjecture in the
Fig. 5. The result manifest the amplitude A is decrease as b close to b′ gradually. And, the
oscillation fades away as b > b′. The simulation interprets why the cooperation preference
is changed fiercely near b′.
Furthermore, the analysis in M3.2 suggest∆Π:d/(∆Π:d+∆Π:c) = 1/2 is the threshold
of oscillation form in the SD RLEGs. However, ∆Π:d/(∆Π:d + ∆Π:c) always smaller
than 1/2 in the standard SD RLEGs. Thereby, we replaced the standard form with Π =
(6, b2; 7, 2), in which b2 is also a turning parameter as b in the standard form. The simulation
shows a arrhythmic oscillation arises as pc − pd > 0 (Fig. 6 (c-d)), which is quite different
from the periodic oscillation in (a-b). However, the oscillation fades away as p∗c − p∗d tend
to zero (e-f). Therefore, our analysis in the main text is verified by the simulation.
2.2 The further investigation on initialization in SH RLEGs
In the replicate dynamic equation (RDE) of traditional evolutionary game (EG) for Stag
Hunt (SH) game setting, f∗c = 1 and f∗c = 0 are bistable fixed points on the cooperation
preference. There is an unstable interior fixed point, fc = ∆Π:d/(∆Π:d+Π:c). The system
will converge to all-cooperation if initial cooperation preference fc0 < ∆Π:d/(∆Π:d+Π:c),
otherwise, defection is dominating. In other words, the convergence direction determined
by the initial cooperation preference. Interesting questions are then raised in SH RLEGs:
whether there are bistable fixed cooperation preference? And, whether there is an appropri-
ate Q-table setting under which the convergence direction determined by the initial cooper-
ation preference?
As a matter of fact, the analysis in M3.2 indicates there are two pure strict equilibrium
points and a mixed weak equilibrium point in the SH RLEGs. And, the strict points are
stable while the weak point is unstable. Thus, there are bistable fixed cooperation preference
as in the EGs in analysis. It is reasonable to assume there is attraction domain for each stable
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Fig. 6 (Color online) The time series of ρc over MC step in various SD RLEGs. The game parameter
in (a-f) b2 = 2.1, 2.2, 5.5, 3.5, 3.2 and 3.0 for Π = (6, b2; 7, 2), respectively. The learning parameters
α = γ = 0.9,  = 0.02 in all panels. The scale of system N = 10000.
fixed cooperation preference. And the convergence direction depends on initialization locate
at which attraction domain in the phase space.
Here, we appoint the initialization in the protocol of main text as the standard initializa-
tion. To survey the influence of initialization on the convergence of cooperation preference,
we replace the standard initialized method with a special method in our simulation. Different
from the standard initialization in (a) of Fig. 7, the each agent is at state C and its Q-table
meets conditions, Qcc > Qcd and Qdc > Qdd, in the initialization. The result in (a) and (b)
shows there are bistable cooperation preferences in RLEGs for the SH game setting as the
analysis in M3.2.
For the high-dimensional RLEGs, the exact attraction domain of each fixed point is hard
to be achieved. Less-than-ideal alternative, we focus on how to control the convergence di-
rection in a certain initialize method. In other word, the method is able to insure the initial
point in the desired attraction domain. On the basis of results in the static, we explore a
method to initialize agents’ Q-table, under which the convergence direction is only deter-
mined by the pc0 as  → 0. Here, pc0 is the initial fraction of cooperators in the agents
following h function.
The analysis in the static shows that a frozen individual’s mode can be only eroded in
m-events even though it is not the optimal. So, we set all agents are in a mode at pc0 and
their mode cannot be eroded in f-events, i.e. almost all agents are frozen in their initial mode
before pc0 changes for the initialization. In the initialization, 1) Qcc > Qcd, Qdc > Qdd for
agents in CCM, 2) Qdd > Qdc and Qcd > Qcc for agents in DDM, and 3) Qcd > Qcc and
Qdc > Qdd for agents in CDM. Besides, max
sa
{Qsa} < min{QCCMcc , QCDMcd , QCDMdc , QDDMdd } for
all agent. Then, the convergence direction only depends on pc0 that cooperation dominates
if pc0 > p
∗
c , otherwise defection dominates. The method is employed to initialize agents’
Q-table and state in Fig. 7 (c-d). In (c) and (d), pc0 is just slightly greater and less than p
∗
c ,
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Fig. 7 (Color online) The function of expectation of cooperation preference 〈ρc〉 of b and times series of
ρc over MC step in SH RLEGs. (a-b) shows the function 〈ρ〉 of b under two initializations. In (a), the initial
setting is standard as the main text shows. In (b), initial state is cooperation and Q-table meet Qcc > Qcd
and Qdc > Qdd for all agents. (c-d) shows the time series of ρc in the SH RLEGs under an identical
initialization to Q-table but different to pc0 (see 2.2). There is unstable interior cooperation preference (dash
line) to divide the convergence direction under the initial Q-table setting. In (c-d), the gaming parameter
b = 8, i.e. p∗c = 0.555, and pc0 = 0.56, 0.55. The learning parameters in panels α = γ = 0.9,  = 0.02.
The number of agents N = 10000.
respectively. The simulation shows the convergence direction can be controlled via initial
pc0 in our method.
2.3 The numerical result in the RLEGs for SD and MS game settings
In the M3.3, a numerical method embedding mean-field is raised to apprehend RLEGs. In
the method, we omit the heterogeneity of agents’ Q-table so as to simplify the analysis and
employ a homogeneous average Q-table for all agents. The method is decent as agents’ Q-
table is homogeneous at last, such as PD RLEG with a pure equilibrium point p∗. It is able to
give the final cooperation preference and agents’ Q-table. Here, we state that the method is
deficient via simulation if the heterogeneity of Q-table for different agents is non-negligible.
In the case, the method always prove an identical final cooperation preference ρc(∞) = 1/2
and average Q-table if p∗ is weak and unique (Fig. 8 and Fig. 9).
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Fig. 8 (Color online) The compare between simulation and numerical result for the times series of ρc
over MC step in the RLEGs with a mixed p∗c . In (a) and (b), the tuning parameters of the standard matrix
are b = 7.5 (p∗c = 0.423) and 2.5 (p∗c = 0.1667) for MS and SD games. The learning parameters are
α = γ = 0.9,  = 0.02. The number of agents is N = 10000.
The supplementary 11
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Fig. 9 The compare between simulation and numerical result for the times series of Q¯sa over MC
steps in MS and SD RLEGs. In RLEG for the MS and SD game, the parameters are shared with Fig. 8 (a)
and (b), respectively.
